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Workplace flexibility practices and corporate performance: 
evidence from the British private sector 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the relationship between workplace flexibility practices (WFPs) and corporate 
performance using data from the British Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2004. 
Disaggregating WFPs into numerical, functional and cost aspects, enables the analysis of their 
relationships to an objective measure of corporate performance, namely workplace financial turnover. 
Furthermore separate analyses are presented for different types of workplace: differentiated by 
workforce size; ownership; age; wage level and unionisation. Results show that different types of 
workplaces need to pay attention to the mix of WFPs they adopt. We find that certain cost WFPs (profit-
related pay, merit pay and payment-by-results) have strong positive relationships with corporate 
performance. However, training delivers mixed corporate performance results, while the extent of job 
autonomy and the proportion of part-time employees in a workplace have an inverse association with 
corporate performance. Given the limited existing research examining disaggregated measures of WFPs 
and objectively measured corporate performance, this paper offers useful insights for firms, policy 
makers and the overall economy. 
Keywords 
Workplace flexibility practices; corporate performance; financial turnover; WERS 2004; private 
sector; Great Britain. 
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Introduction 
The wide range of workplace flexibility practices (WFPs) – such as part-time work, flexitime, 
working from home – has increased significantly in Britain against the backdrop of heightened 
competitive pressures in the overall economy. Hence, it is vital that firms know which WFPs are most 
likely to improve corporate performance. Moreover, this information is most useful if tailored 
specifically to workplace characteristics such as workforce size, age or ownership. However, there is 
relatively little research on workplace flexibility provision which disaggregates WFPs and thereby 
enables the relationship between each individual component and corporate performance to be examined. 
Thus, this paper puts forward analyses of a large variety of WFPs and focuses directly on their 
relationship with corporate performance according to specific workplace types. The paper addresses two 
intertwined research problems, relating to both the application of WFPs and its limited coverage in the 
literature. It seeks to clarify the effectiveness of employers’ and policy makers’ choices of WFPs. 
Therefore, it provides added value to practitioners by tailoring results to different workplace types. 
In relation to the limited coverage in the literature, the paper makes three contributions. Firstly, it 
moves beyond existing limitations through the development of a disaggregated model of WFPs. 
Secondly, this approach enables the analysis of previously hidden variations in WFPs with regard to 
corporate performance. Finally, it rejects the use of subjective measures of corporate performance and 
adopts an objective measure in the form of financial turnover. 
The wide diversity of workplace flexibility initiatives can be classified into numerical, functional and 
cost flexibility. Numerical (or temporal) flexibility relates to the adjustment of the number of workers or 
their working time, by using WFPs such as part-time working, shift working, flexitime or job sharing. 
Functional flexibility focuses on the adjustment of the job content or how employees are expected to 
perform their jobs; examples of such practices include training and job autonomy. Cost (or wage) 
flexibility refers to the determination of remuneration and examples include merit pay and performance-
related pay.  
Given the potential benefits of implementing WFPs, the increase in employer provision of WFPs, 
policy makers’ interests in flexible working and the related academic literature are not unsurprising. In 
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Britain, it is estimated that the vast majority of workplaces (96%) implement some form of flexible 
working and the most widespread WFPs are part-time working (88%), working from home on a regular 
basis (54%), and flexitime (50%) (CIPD, 2012). Flexible work has been associated with a number of 
micro- and macroeconomic outcomes, emphasising the potential of flexibility to contribute to superior 
financial performance (DTI, 2003), economic development, or recovery from recession. These might be 
achieved by reducing labour market rigidities, attracting foreign direct investment, or creating a modern 
and competitive working climate (CBI, 2010; Whyman, 2006). Indeed, more than two thirds of firms in 
Britain during the 2008 ‘credit crunch’ recession have adopted one or more WFPs in order to resolve 
difficult trading pressures (CBI, 2009). Additionally, WFPs may deliver improved work-life balance to 
employees (CBI, 2010; Wooden, Warren and Drago, 2009). 
This paper’s originality and value lie in identifying and responding to existing gaps in the literature, 
specifically on the relationship between disaggregated measures of workplace flexibility and an 
objective measure of corporate performance. The paper offers three main value-adding contributions. 
First, it moves beyond existing empirical limitations through the development of a disaggregated model 
of WFPs, with flexibility categorised into numerical, functional and cost areas. The main reason for this 
is that it covers the full spectrum of flexible working initiatives available to an employer. Analyses 
which use disaggregated WFPs, organised into classifications, are potentially beneficial in clarifying 
employers’ and policy makers’ choices and trade-offs between practices. Only studies employing this 
approach can ensure that a full range of workplace flexibility options and their benefits are examined. 
Evidently, this classification constitutes the backbone of this study. 
Second, this approach is a step-change in the analysis of WFPs, as it is able to showcase previously 
hidden variations in WFPs with regard to corporate performance, whilst indicating both the impact and 
potential trade-offs involved in developing a particular mix of WFPs. Of further value to practitioners 
and academic research is the analyses and presentation of results by workplace types. To this purpose, 
the disaggregated set of flexibility practices is assessed within a range of workplace characteristics, 
explicitly: workforce size; nationality of ownership; workplace age; workplace wage level; and 
unionisation. Therefore, rather than treating flexibility as a unitary concept uniformly applied across 
workplaces, this study distinguishes those WFPs which work better in different circumstances. 
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Third, the paper rejects the use of subjective measures of corporate performance, which are likely to 
suffer from reliability issues given the inherent problems of interpreting such indicators. Thus, an 
objective measure in the form of financial turnover is used to capture corporate performance. This 
measure allows for a more valuable and consistent set of recommendations to be derived. In this way, 
the paper highlights the importance of the composition of flexibility schemes aimed at optimising 
corporate performance.  
The paper is structured as follows. The review of the literature emphasises the way in which this 
paper directly addresses weaknesses in the extant research on WFPs. The empirical analysis presents the 
method, methodology and data used. Results are tailored to workplace types; the discussion of results 
exposes the ways in which numerical, functional and cost WFPs link to corporate performance. The 
final section concludes. 
 
Review of the Literature  
Benefits of workplace flexibility. WFPs are associated with varied outcomes for both employees and 
employers. Some of the main reasons for promoting WFPs are to allow employees to achieve better 
work-life balance, improve employee attendance, or increase job satisfaction and commitment while 
reducing stress (Böckerman, Bryson and Ilmakunnas, 2012; Glover and Butler, 2012; Jones et al., 2009; 
Russell, O’Connell and McGinnity, 2009). The inference is that employee benefits may result in 
positive outcomes for the firm, for instance higher retention rates, lower retraining costs, increased 
loyalty and morale, higher work productivity, and reduced incidences of accidents and grievances 
(CIPD, 2012; Dex and Schreibl, 2001; Kelliher and Anderson, 2010; Poelmans, Chinchilla and 
Cardona, 2003). Consequently, each of these outcomes has the potential to enhance corporate 
performance. Indeed, one significant conclusion from the literature is that, on balance, there is positive 
association between the use of certain WFPs and organisational outcomes (Bryson and Freeman, 2008; 
Dex and Smith, 2002; Kleinknecht et al., 2006; Michie and Sheehan-Quinn, 2001; Stavrou, Brewster, 
and Charalambous, 2010; Whyman and Petrescu, 2013).  
Linking workplace flexibility to the high-performance and HRM literature. WFPs may be introduced 
as part of a shift towards the creation of ‘high performance’ work practices (HPWPs). Examples of 
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HPWPs include autonomous work teams, problem-solving groups, job autonomy and incentive pay. An 
important facet of the HPWPs literature is the assessment of how different practices may fit more 
appropriately with the prevailing business strategy (Addison and Belfield, 2001; Appelbaum et al., 
2000; Fernie and Metcalf, 1995; Ichniowski et al., 1996). This HPWPs literature is part of the wider 
area of human resource management (HRM) research, which similarly focuses much attention on 
highlighting the potential link between HRM practices and better corporate performance (Arthur, 1994; 
Batt, 2002; Buller and McEvoy, 2012; Delery and Doty, 1996; Guest, 2011; Huselid, 1995; Lazear, 
2000; Stavrou, Brewster and Charalambous, 2010). Thus, HRM practices are also seen as a form of 
competitive advantage, with an important strategic role of achieving business success.  
Borrowing from the HRM theory to study WFPs. Research into WFPs and performance is advanced 
primarily via empirical analyses, as opposed to theory. This is possibly because theoretical 
conceptualisation of WFPs can be seen as akin to HRM theory, the latter being much developed yet in 
turmoil with regard to the precise theoretical underpinnings of the HRM-performance link. It is 
suggested in this paper that WFPs research can take advantage of similar theoretical features existent 
within the burgeoning HRM literature. This is because, to a large extent, both WFPs research and the 
HRM literature focus essentially on a common object of study, namely workplace practices. Thus, there 
is potential for WFPs research to borrow and utilise theoretical foundations from the HRM literature.  
In particular, Barney (1991) proposes the resource-based view of the firm, which posits that HRM 
practices are a competitive means for firms. The related literature emphasises that HRM practices act as 
rare, inimitable and valuable organisational resources (Huselid, 1995; Wright, Dunford and Snell 2001; 
Stavrou, Brewster and Charalambous, 2010). Similarly, in this paper, WFPs is theoretically 
conceptualised as a competitive tool for firms. Hence, this paper proposes an investigation into how 
WFPs link to corporate performance in view of workplaces being able to potentially outsmart 
competitors by implementing a superior mix of WFPs that enables them to achieve better outcomes.  
However, it is worthwhile highlighting that the HRM literature does not establish clearly the 
theoretical (or empirical) ways in which workplace practices may affect performance. Indeed, there are 
significant on-going theoretical debates concerning the establishment of a theoretical framework for a 
HRM-performance link (Buller and McEvoy, 2012; Glover and Butler, 2012; Guest, 2011; Whyman et 
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al., 2009). For instance, Guest (2011) recognises the complexity of theoretical and empirical research on 
HRM and performance through providing an analysis of the past two decades of this research. Guest 
(2011) concludes that the empirically demonstrated association between HRM and performance has 
reached sophistication, whilst the HRM theoretical debate has not achieved consensus and, instead, has 
many challenges ahead. Thus, no generally accepted theory exists in the HRM literature on the topic of 
linking workplace practices and performance, while the empirical literature on this topic increases albeit 
with mixed results (Buller and McEvoy, 2012; Glover and Butler, 2012; Guest, 2011; Stavrou, Brewster 
and Charalambous, 2010). 
This paper extends the theoretical framework of the resource-based firm (Barney, 1991) by applying 
this HRM theory to study workplace flexibility. Figure 1 shows in detail the way in which workplace 
flexibility is theorised in our paper, with WFPs mapped according to the classification of numerical, 
functional and cost types of practices. 
FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE 
Empirical findings on some numerical, functional and cost WFPs. There is considerable potential in 
empirical developments of WFPs research and it is in this regard that this paper makes one of its 
contributions. Empirical findings are summarised according to studies on numerical, functional and cost 
WFPs, as follows. In some empirical studies analysing numerical or temporal WFPs, the literature 
indicates a potential positive link with performance. For instance, working from home or the use of 
internal labour markets (Doeringer and Piore, 1971) link to better organisational outcomes, at least 
through increased employee job satisfaction, lower labour turnover or lower absenteeism (Dex and 
Smith, 2002; Gariety and Shaffer, 2007). However, it is found that part-time working, shift work and 
job sharing may have more of an indeterminate relationship with organisational outcomes, depending on 
whether the uptake of these WFPs is voluntary or imposed on employees. The respective beneficial 
outcomes might also depend on whether these WFPs negatively affect employee wages and career 
prospects, despite enabling a better work-life balance (Hirsch, 2005; Manning and Petrongolo, 2008; 
Russell, O’Connell and McGinnity, 2009; Stevens, Brown, and Lee, 2004; Wooden, Warren and Drago, 
2009). Yet, based on the few existing relevant studies on WFPs, a more explicit transmission 
mechanism, by which numerical or temporal WFPs translate into objective corporate performance, 
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remains unknown. For instance, the link between flexitime and performance is disputed (Russell, 
O’Connell and McGinnity, 2009).  
The empirical attempt to establish the relationships between functional WFPs and performance 
involves the assessment of a relatively large number of practices. Some functional WFPs, such 
teamwork or job autonomy, are analysed in the high-performance HRM literature, where studies report 
mixed results (see Berg, Kalleberg and Appelbaum, 2003). Though not without their critics (e.g. 
Godard, 2004), functional WFPs are mostly linked to superior performance by providing employees 
with a greater sense of personal control and efficacy. This arguably creates a motivated and committed 
workforce, which in turn has a positive effect on corporate performance (Appelbaum et al., 2000; 
Arthur, 1994; Berg, Kalleberg and Appelbaum, 2003; Huselid, 1995; Ichniowski et al., 1996). 
Finally, the empirical literature suggests that cost WFPs would be expected to have a positive 
association with corporate performance, by linking rewards to performance, but the evidence here is 
also mixed. It remains unclear whether individual or group-based cost WFPs lead to better performance. 
The former may encourage employees to be more productive in return for clearly recognised 
performance. Individual performance can be easily traced, in theory, and rewarded accordingly by using 
merit pay or pay related to performance (Fernie and Metcalf, 1995; Lazear, 2000). However, certain 
group-based cost WFPs, particularly employee profit-sharing or shareholding, have met resistance, such 
as from trade unions. In the UK, unions continue to have an important role in wage formation in both 
public and private sectors (Blanchflower and Bryson, 2010). Resistance to group-based WFPs is at least 
in part due to the employer difficulties in specifying precisely the ways in which profit-sharing or 
shareholding are to be implemented. These potentially give rise to greater managerial discretion on pay, 
or bias in the managerial assessment of performance. A further drawback of group-based rewards is that 
work is not linked directly to an employee’s distinct performance, but more directly to workforce 
collective effort. This may provide perverse incentives for individual employees to shirk, thereby 
resulting in poorer organisational performance. Indeed, in establishments implementing the collective 
cost WFPs of setting pay through unions, the link between WFP and performance may be weakened 
(Marginson, Arrowsmith and Gray, 2008).  
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Critique. There are a number of weaknesses in the research on workplace practices, with many 
studies highlighting the need for further work (Berg, Kalleberg and Appelbaum, 2003; Ichniowski et al., 
1996; Kalleberg, 2001; Stavrou, Brewster and Charalambous, 2010). One pervasive weakness pertains 
to the disjointed nature of the literature that negates comparative work. There is extensive variation in 
definitions of practices and performance measures, which has long been a cause of concern (Ichniowski 
et al., 1996). Data availability with sufficient coverage of workplace flexibility issues and objective 
measures of performance needs to improve, since too much research is based on case studies in a 
particular industry setting (Guest 2011; Stavrou, Brewster and Charalambous, 2010). 
Subjective measures of performance are more commonly used than objective measures, presumably 
because they are more readily available. Consequently, numerous studies use subjective performance 
indicators, such as manager-rated financial performance, or less quantifiable measures of performance 
such as employee morale, organisational commitment and job satisfaction (Dex and Scheibl, 2001; 
Giardini and Kabst, 2008; Origo and Pagani, 2008). The downside of using subjective performance 
measures is that they are potentially less reliable. For instance, in the data used in this paper, there was 
only a very weak correlation (with a statistically significant Pearson correlation coefficient below 0.10) 
between the chosen objective performance measure (annual financial turnover) and a typical subjective 
performance measure (workplace performance was rated by the manager in relation to the manager-
perceived industry average). 
A further weakness in the literature is its focus only on one particular aspect of workplace flexibility, 
such as working from home (Gariety and Shaffer, 2007), or analysing a limited set of WFPs (Stavrou 
and Kilaniotis, 2010). These approaches, therefore, do not offer a comprehensive view of the effects of 
WFPs on performance. Furthermore, it is certainly conceivable that different bundles of WFPs might 
optimise performance gains for different workplace types. Yet, the existing literature does not extend 
the analysis to examine the workplace characteristics which may themselves affect WFPs’ impact. 
Consequently, it is not possible to ascertain the relative importance of distinct WFPs in a workplace, or 
the different ways in which heterogeneous workplaces may benefit from WFPs. 
This literature review highlights a clear need to advance the study of WFPs in order to examine the 
way in which the range of numerical, functional and cost WFPs are related to corporate performance 
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across different workplace types. The HRM literature has previously examined certain of these 
relationships, however the extant studies do not implement a comprehensive framework of research with 
regard to the numerical, functional and cost classification of WFPs. Therefore, their main limitation lies 
in not being able to assess and clarify the detailed role and usefulness of WFPs. 
Contributions made by this paper. In view of the weaknesses identified in the literature, this paper 
advances WFPs research in the following ways. First, it analyses the link between WFPs and an 
objective measure of corporate performance; hence, contributing this under-researched topic (Giardini 
and Kabst, 2008; Whyman and Baimbridge, 2006; Whyman and Petrescu, 2013). Second, it 
distinguishes between different types of flexibility areas (numerical, functional, and cost), since such a 
distinction is important in providing decision makers with the information required to choose the 
appropriate types and mix of WFPs. The disaggregation of WFPs is used to ascertain the multi-faceted 
nature of workplace flexibility as opposed to treating flexibility as a homogenous phenomenon. Thus, 
this research allows for potential conflict between diverse types of types of flexibility to be accessed by 
noting that one practice may contribute to, while another detract from, corporate performance. Third, the 
literature does not usually distinguish the differences in results when assessing the use of WFPs in 
various types of workplaces, whereas here results are tailored to particular workplace types. This 
enables an estimation of the importance of enterprise characteristics in the design of flexibility 
initiatives. Fourth, the study accounts for the implementation extent of some WFPs as opposed to 
merely considering whether the practice is or not implemented. Thus, the paper responds to the 
repeatedly identified need of improvement in the measurement of practices, which can bring to light 
new and better informed research (Bryson, Green and Whitfield, 2008; Petrescu and Simmons, 2008). 
Finally, the timing of the analysis is relevant, as more research is needed under recessionary pressures in 
order to advance the current understanding of WFPs and their potential to influence corporate 
performance. 
 
Empirical Analysis 
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Data. The data for this study was taken from the management and financial datasets of the nationally 
representative Workplace Employee Relations Survey 2004 (WERS 2004) (DTI, 2005). The WERS 
2004 management data set is cross-sectional and comprises 2,300 British workplaces with a workforce 
larger than five employees. A workplace was described as the organisation of work comprising the 
activities of a single employer carried out at one or more premises. Data was collected via 
questionnaires and the respondent is the workplace manager. As a national dataset, the WERS 2004 data 
set has the advantage of collecting information on WFPs in diverse institutional environments (Stavrou 
and Ierodiakonou, 2011; Stavrou and Kilaniotis, 2010). Combining the management and the financial 
datasets reduced the number of observations, as financial data for all workplaces were not available. 
However, this paper argues that the drawback of a reduced sample size was more than outweighed by 
having an objective measure of performance. Once missing observations and public sector workplaces 
(where financial turnover reporting does not apply) were excluded, the final data sample consisted of 
556 observations. Excluding public sector workplaces from analysis was also important, since there are 
entrenched differences in the application of WFPs between the public and the private sectors (Gray, 
2002; Millward and Machin, 2007); although the merits of WFPs within the public sector are of interest, 
they fall beyond the scope of the current study.  
Model Specification. The empirical model drew upon a disaggregated set of variables associated with 
workplace flexibility (see Figure 1) and analysed their relationship with corporate performance. The 
model is formally expressed as: 
𝐿𝑛(𝑇) =∝ +𝛽𝑋 + 𝜃𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 + 𝜇𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 + 𝜌𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀                                          (1) 
where T is workplace financial turnover. The logarithm of annual turnover reported by the manager for 
the period 2003-2004 is the dependent variable used in this paper. A logarithmic transformation of 
financial indicators is a common feature of the literature and normalises this variable (Almeida-Santos 
and Mumford, 2005; Forth and Millward, 2004). The clear advantage of using the WERS 2004 financial 
data is that it offered an objective measure of organisational outcomes. The mean turnover is £0.7 
million with standard deviation £3.7 million.  
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X is a vector of control variables for workplace characteristics. More specifically, these were the 
headcount of employees (along with its square), the ownership of the status (British or non-British), the 
age of the workplace, the proportion of low waged employees, whether the work force is unionised and 
a dummy variable to capture workplaces with fewer than 50 employees. As well as featuring as control 
variables across the various empirical models, these variables were used to disaggregate the data 
allowing more than one model to be estimated. The rationale for disaggregating the data and estimating 
multiple models is that the effects of the independent variables on financial turnover may differ across 
various types of workplaces. For example, the effects of working from home on financial turnover may 
be different across workplaces that are unionised and those that are not. Thus, the disaggregation of the 
data offered a more detailed and insightful perspective on the relationships between WFPs and corporate 
performance. Table 1 illustrates the disaggregation of the overall sample according to these five 
variables and resultant subsamples. 
TABLE 1 NEAR HERE 
Numerical, Functional andCost are vectors of WFPs taken from the data; ∝ is the constant term; β, θ, µ 
and ρ are coefficients to be determined; while 𝜀 is the error term. The rationale is to examine aspects of 
workplace flexibility so that these can be contrasted and compared with respect to their relative 
importance across different types of workplaces. The selection of independent variables across 
numerical, functional and cost flexibility in equation 1 is organised in accordance with the model 
illustrated in Figure 1. It encompasses as much of the variety and diversity of WFPs as possible, given 
limitations presented by data availability and the need to ensure model rigour. Table 2 provides 
summary statistics of the variables and illustrates that the WERS 2004 offers a good range of WFPs. 
TABLE 2 NEAR HERE 
Results 
The results of the empirical analyses are presented in Table 3 across 12 regression models to allow 
comparison. The main regression is based on the entire sample of 556 workplaces in model 1, while the 
adjacent models are organised with respect to the workplace types noted in Table 1.  
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Model testing. The series of linear multiple regression analyses are performed with diagnostic tests 
for multicollinearity, homoscedasticity, linearity and model specification, following established WERS 
studies (e.g. Green, 2008; Jones et al., 2009). Details of each test are shown at the end of Table 3. 
Firstly, variance inflation factor (VIF) is used as a test for multicollinearity. If the value of the VIF test 
statistic is greater than 10.0, then multicollinearity is an issue. However, VIF has values ranging from 
1.65 to 3.74, significantly below the threshold value. Therefore, multicollinearity is not a concern. 
Secondly, in relation to heteroscedasticity, the White test indicates this is absent from our models; the p-
values for each of the models were not significant. Thirdly, endogeneity is examined through the 
standard procedure of testing for association between the estimated residuals and independent variables. 
The absence of any significant relationships also dispels econometric-based concerns here. Additionally, 
a theoretical-based ground for rejecting endogeneity is the literature suggesting that WFPs have an 
impact on organisational outcomes and not vice-versa (Stavrou, Brewster and Charalambous, 2010; 
Stavrou and Kilaniotis, 2010). Thus, even if causality cannot be assessed because of the cross-sectional 
nature of WERS 2004, it can be implied that WFPs have an impact on financial turnover, rather than the 
reverse. Lastly, in estimations available from authors, model stability is tested via alternative ways of 
modelling, where estimated coefficient sizes and signs remain the same. 
TABLE 3 NEAR HERE 
Discussion of Results  
The results validate the need for this study by highlighting the existence of potential benefits that 
derive from ascertaining the relationships between some WFPs - distributed across numerical, 
functional, and cost flexibility areas - and financial turnover. Results show that a number of WFPs are 
associated with significant changes in financial turnover. In some instances, the changes in financial 
turnover are positive, therefore significant support for some WFPs can be offered. However, in other 
instances, support is limited.  
The relationships between financial turnover and the control variables used in the empirical analysis 
are of note. Workplace size, measured as the number of employees in the workplace, controls for the 
effect of workforce size on financial turnover. Larger workplaces, by their very nature, will have larger 
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financial turnover, but the relationship between workforce size and turnover is unlikely to be monotonic. 
Instead, there are likely to be diminishing returns such that, beyond a threshold, the increased returns 
from recruiting an extra employee diminish and continue to do so up until the cost of recruiting extra 
labour outweighs any increase in turnover. Another reason for the inclusion of this control variable was 
that, without doing so, the estimates of the independent variables were likely to be biased, given that 
WFPs were likely to be more prevalent across different workplace sizes. For instance, larger workplaces 
have more resources to implement WFPs (Golden, 2009; Michie and Sheehan-Quinn, 2001). Findings 
showed that workplace size is significant in all models. The sign of the coefficients for its quadratic is 
negative, as hypothesized, suggesting an inverse U-shape relationship exists between workplace size 
and financial turnover; as workforce size increases, financial turnover increases, but at a 
diminishing rate until the turning point, thereafter an inverse relationship occurs. 
Workplaces that are fully British owned, generated lower levels of financial turnover at the mean 
compared to those workplaces that are not fully British owned. Across all but two models, the 
coefficient was significant but negative. However, it is difficult to justify why wholly British owned 
workplaces should systematically under-perform compared with those that are not fully British owned.  
Two further control variables captured workplace longevity: Workplace age (up to 9 years) and 
Workplace age (10 to 24 years). Workplace age (25 or more years) was the reference group and 
excluded for collinearity reasons. Compared to the reference group, these two groups, representing 
relatively younger workplaces, showed significant differences where workplaces were non-unionised 
(model 10) and where workplaces had fewer than 50 employees (model 11). Further, there is a 
significant difference in the coefficient of workplaces aged 10 to 24 years, compared with the reference 
group for the model for Fully British owned workplaces (model 2). In all these instances, workplaces 
aged 25 years or more had a superior financial turnover. Where variations proved to be statistically 
significant, older workplaces had superior financial turnover to younger ones. It is likely that these 
differences were capturing first-mover advantages that older workplaces had over their younger 
counterparts in the respective sectors. 
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The final control variable worthy of comment was Workplace size: under 50 employees. Across all 
models, the coefficients were significant at the conventional levels, but are negative. The effects 
captured by this variable were over and above the diminishing returns resulting from the effects of 
workforce size (as noted earlier). The negative coefficient further emphasised that small workplaces 
with fewer than 50 employees generate significantly lower financial turnover than those with 50 or more 
employees.  
The rest of this section presents and discusses the results for WFPs, by flexibility area. 
Numerical WFPs and Financial Turnover. The WFP relating to working from home is positive and 
statistically significant in non-unionised workplaces, but otherwise this WFP did not have a significant 
association with financial turnover. This finding might reassure those managers who remain uneasy 
about the shirking possibilities arising from the provision of working from home. However, its 
significance in only the non-unionised model may have captured a dual benefit, as follows. Firstly, 
employees may view this WFP as a privilege and, in turn, respond via better performance. Secondly, 
unions, which could be offering a layer of employee job protection that may encourage shirking, are 
absent; thus employees may be more productive due to job insecurity. Given that in excess of a quarter 
of the British labour force is estimated to complete a proportion of their work from home, studies of this 
WFP has remained limited with debates in the literature on its ability to improve work-life balance 
(Felstead, Jewson and Walters, 2002; Gariety and Shaffer, 2007; Russell, O’Connell and McGinnity, 
2009).  
Within the group of numerical flexibility, the only significant WFPs of note are shift working and job 
sharing among those workplaces aged between 10 and 24 years; the coefficients of these two variables 
were positive and negative respectively. These results suggested that shift working had the desired 
impact on financial turnover, whilst job sharing reduced financial turnover for those workplaces (aged 
between 10 and 24 years) compared with the same group of workplaces that did not employ these 
WFPs. With respect to shift working, not all employees have the same degree of freedom to engage in 
shift working, since in some workplaces this WFP may simply not be available. However, for those 
workplaces providing the option of shift working, there was a significant and positive effect on financial 
turnover. The finding potentially implies that workplaces using job sharing were able to employ from a 
16 
 
wider pool of people with a preference for different work patterns. Therefore, they gained an advantage 
over similar workplaces that were restricted in not just the pattern of work, but also their recruitment 
pool. The associated literature is mixed, with indeterminate effects suggested in relation to shift working 
and alternative measures of performance, such as absenteeism (Dionne and Dostie, 2007; Frick and 
Malo, 2008) or job satisfaction (Schields and Price, 2002). Nevertheless, there is support for the 
contention that shift working had a positive relationship to corporate performance, such as through 
facilitating continuous use of capital equipment, decreased employee absence and/or superior reactions 
to changes in patterns of demand (Frick and Malo, 2008; Mayshar and Halevy, 1997).  
With respect to job sharing, the information collected in the WERS 2004 refers to a full-time job 
being shared with another employee, as opposed to the reduction of working time for workers under 
contract in order to create jobs. The latter has been extensively used by European OECD countries and 
adopted in Nordic countries in order to reduce unemployment (Miyakoshi, 2001). However, this study 
suggested sharing the same job is relatively inefficient as far as financial turnover is concerned.  
In two of the models, non-unionised (model 10) and under 50 employees (model 11), the proportion 
of part-time workers in total workers was negatively associated with financial turnover. This is not 
entirely surprising, as full-time workers are more likely to be committed to their job than part-time 
workers. Therefore, full-time workers would offer greater levels of productivity, which may lead to 
better financial turnover. Another consideration might be that part-time work is unattractive for the most 
productive workers, particularly within a high-wage workplace. This may be due to employees 
associating part-time jobs with penalties (i.e. fewer career development or training opportunities) when 
compared to full-time jobs (Booth and Wood, 2008; Connolly and Gregory, 2008; Tilly, 1991; Tilly, 
1992).  
Overall, the lack of significance across numerous numerical WFPs suggests that workplaces are 
structured in ways that mitigate against comparative advantages that might normally be accrued from 
such practices. 
 
Functional WFPs and Financial Turnover. The WFP measuring whether the majority of employees had 
received time off for training (training extent) exhibited a change of sign depending on the age of the 
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workplace. Younger workplaces (models 4 and 5) show a negative association with this variable, while 
more established (older) establishments have a positive association. This implies that workplace age 
leads to differences in organisational needs for training. It also reinforced the idea that training 
programmes, if not properly specified and targeted, may not always be effective. Alternatively, it is 
possible that a substitution effect existed, if flexible forms of employment led to a reduction in both the 
incidence and intensity of employer paid training (Arulampalam and Booth, 1998; Draca and Green, 
2004). In view of positive associations between training and various measures of performance, as found 
extensively in the literature (Jones et al., 2009; Pfeffer, 1998; Russell, Terborg and Powers, 1985; 
Stavrou, Brewster and Charalambous, 2010), the negative association between training and financial 
turnover in this paper is unexpected, but not unique (Cunha et al., 2002; Delery and Doty, 1996). It is 
also possible that the construct for training failed to capture the way in which the need of training are 
assessed, its quality, or whether it is fit for purpose. 
The analysis produced a similarly unexpected result related to time-off for training (training length). 
This raised questions over two aspects, namely the quality of the training and the appropriateness of off-
the-job training. Although neither of these aspects was captured by the WERS 2004 dataset, the 
literature usually found that the broad provision of training across a workforce is positively associated 
with improvement in financial turnover, whereas time-off for training had either a negative or an 
inconsistent association with financial turnover (Almeida-Santos and Mumford, 2005; Arulampalam 
and Booth, 1998). Hence, it appeared that the content and quality of the training, as well as access to 
training for the right employees, are more important than the fact that training had been offered per se 
(Almeida-Santos and Mumford, 2005; Arulampalam and Booth, 1998). 
Job enrichment (job enrichment supported by formal training) was positively associated with 
financial turnover for unionised workplaces, albeit with a relatively small sized coefficient. The result 
could be due to job enrichment generating job variety which potentially motivated employees to achieve 
high performance. Moreover, the risks from labour turnover could be lower if the workforce shared 
skills and could step-in at short notice to replace colleagues, which could be beneficial to financial 
turnover. Additionally, given that not all training variables proved to be significant in the analysis, this 
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result appeared to suggest that broadening the spread of training across the workforce is potentially 
more important than the provision of time away from the workplace for off-the-job training. 
The quality circles variable focused on the notion of problem-solving and sharing of innovative 
ideas. It was significant in non-fully British owned and relatively low-wage workplaces. Its negative 
association with financial turnover in high-wage workplaces was rather unexpected, because it differed 
from reports on the positive association between quality circles and the up-skilling of the workforce 
(Green, Felstead and Gallie, 2003), theoretically leading to higher wages. An explanation for this result 
could be that in the long-term, quality circles turn out to benefit the workplace via improved skills and 
performance, but those positive effects cannot be noted in this cross-sectional study. Alternatively, 
further detail on the implementation of quality circles could hold the answer as to whether this WFP had 
a positive or negative association with performance (Hill, 1991). 
The relatively large, yet only marginally significant, effect of outsourcing temporary vacancy filling 
in mature workplaces of age 10-24 years appeared to lack robustness, since its effect changed to being 
negative if workplaces had over 25 years in operation. This could be interpreted as a consequence of 
increased workforce specialisation in the most mature workplaces. Indeed, successful outsourcing 
depends on the existence, suitability and alignment of the external expertise with in-house 
needs (Sako and Tierney, 2007). Hence, outsourcing could pose a higher challenge if work 
processes are more complex, such as may be the case in more mature workplaces. For instance, 
a greater difficulty would be faced with regard to sourcing suitable candidates if recruitment were 
outsourced. Similarly, a relatively low volume of outsourcing was negatively associated with financial 
turnover. The finding implies that outsourcing could be directly linked to financial turnover, 
thus, outsourcing contracts if workplaces have a poor performance record. 
The extent of job autonomy, when significant, had a consistent and negative relationship with 
financial turnover. This would appear perverse, given the relative consensus within the literature that job 
autonomy facilitated the creation of a motivated and committed workforce (Appelbaum et al., 2000; 
Arthur, 1994; Berg, Kalleberg and Appelbaum, 2003; Petrescu and Simmons, 2008). One possibility is 
that the result reflected the use of job autonomy to reduce work intensity and to increase shirking. 
19 
 
Alternatively, the variable may not have effectively captured the essence of the practice, given that it 
derives from arguably the most subjective interpretation of WFPs included in this study. Indeed, simply 
because a manager perceives employees as having job autonomy, does not imply that employees concur. 
This uncertainty may justify further research, using a more tightly-controlled data-gathering instrument, 
in order to improve the quality of the dataset.  
Finally, when teamwork is used in more than 40% of the workforce, this variable was found to be 
positive and significant in workplaces that had some degree of foreign ownership. Caution should be 
exercised given that the data did not allow an assessment of the level of autonomy that teams possess, 
while autonomy was considered an important determinant of teamwork success (Batt, 2004). 
Nevertheless, building upon previous studies, the results tended to validate the use of teamwork as an 
effective form of functional flexibility (Appelbaum et al., 2000; Banker et al., 1996; DeVaro, 2006). 
 
Cost WFPs and Financial Turnover. The WFP setting pay through trade unions had a negative 
association with financial turnover in not fully British owned (model 3) and unionised (model 9) 
workplaces. Given that firms would be highly unlikely to include trade unions in wage formation in 
workplaces which are not unionised, the latter distinction is not surprising. However, the negative 
relationship with performance is worth noting because of the lack of firm consensus in the literature. For 
example, whilst it is generally accepted that union wage differentials exist (Blanchflower, 1991; 
McKinley, 2008), and this has a significant negative impact upon profitability (Machin, Stewart and van 
Reenan, 1993), there is general disagreement over impacts upon investment and turnover (Denny and 
Nickell, 1992; Machin and Wadhwani, 1991). Moreover, the finding that non-British firms are more 
affected by this phenomenon than British-owned firms is perhaps surprising, given that inward investors 
into the UK have differing relationships with trade unions. For example, while trade union involvement 
in wage formation in the USA might be lower than in the UK, this is not the case in many European 
economies, whilst Japan is characterised by a significant degree of wage coordination (Calmfors and 
Driffill, 1988). Consequently, it would appear to be reasonable to treat these findings with caution 
pending further investigation. 
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Finally, the results pertaining to profit-related payments and merit pay or payment by results 
indicated the potential for cost-related WFPs to offer amongst the most significant contributions to 
financial turnover. Whilst their coefficients were not statistically significant in all of the models, the two 
variables had a key role to play in many of them. Collectively, this would suggest that for many 
workplaces, the flexibility to reward employees for group-based profit-related performance, or 
individual-based performance, induce better corporate performance. The empirical results are perhaps 
not too surprising since the objectives of the firm and those of the employees become somewhat aligned 
by implementing these WFPs; employees had the objective of maximising earnings while, 
simultaneously, employers had the incentive of maximising financial turnover. The relevance of profit-
related payments and merit pay or payments by results, reinforces the existing literature which 
highlights the potential benefits resulting from implementing contingency forms of remuneration based 
upon labour productivity and organisational performance (Addison and Belfield, 2001; Fernie and 
Metcalf, 1995; Heywood, Siebert and Wei, 1997; Lazear, 2000). 
 
Conclusions 
This study poses a vital question regarding the business pursuit of competitive advantage in the 
private sector: how are workplace flexibility practices (WFPs) associated with corporate performance? 
The paper advances the on-going debate in relation to the important relationship between WFPs and the 
vital issue of corporate performance. This is especially crucial in times of economic distress when it is 
ever more vital for companies to enact policies that increase their potential for success. 
A range of workplace practices are matched to the full spectrum of numerical, functional and cost 
WFPs. These practices are assessed with regard to their link to an objective measure of corporate 
performance, depending on workplace types. 
Findings offer multiple value-added insights to organisations and policy makers. By utilising a 
disaggregated model of workplace flexibility to produce results tailored to various workplace 
characteristics (ownership, workplace age, wage levels, unionisation and size), this paper brings to light 
previously unknown connections between WFPs and the key issue corporate performance. Additionally, 
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the study uses an objective measure of performance, namely financial turnover, which is generally 
accepted to be a superior, less controversial, marker of corporate performance than subjective measures. 
In fact, in the data, there are very weak correlations between financial turnover and subjective measures 
of performance. This shows that subjective measures are indeed different to objective ones, and 
validates the choice of using only an objective measure of performance.  
The knowledge deriving from our detailed analysis is also important since it essentially permits 
scrutiny of precisely which WFPs have implications for corporate performance. Results show that WFPs 
offer a mixed recipe of success, with potential pitfalls in that some could be associated with high or low 
corporate performance. Approximately half of the 19 WFPs studied are positively associated with 
corporate financial turnover, meaning that their implementation is more likely to lead to better financial 
organisational outcomes. This finding is especially relevant for cost WFPs, including contingency pay 
methods such as merit pay, payment by results, profit-related pay and shift work. Moreover, operating 
an internal labour market regarding recruitment is a numerical WFP that may offer performance 
advantages.  
Most relationships are, however, sensitive to the particular workplace type. For instance, the 
relationship between performance and training extent (coverage), outsourcing temporary vacancy filling 
or pay settlement via union negotiations fluctuates depending on workplace age and/or ownership. 
Importantly, a number of key findings are contrary to expectations concerning WFPs and corporate 
performance, such as the strong negative association for job autonomy, the use of part-time workers, and 
length of time given off for training. Consequently, the results suggest that a workplace’s choice of 
WFPs needs to be carefully assessed and suitably targeted, whereby different forms of workplace 
flexibility may fit more appropriately with the respective workplace type. The finding that WFPs can be 
a double-edged sword, validates reasons to encourage additional research.  
Results are in line with the proposed resource-based view (RBV) conceptualisation of the firm, 
supporting the assumption that WFPs are rare and valuable organisational resources. This paper finds 
that WFPs are sources of competitive advantage with particular regard to their potential to be associated 
with high corporate performance. By building flexible capabilities in the workplace, WFPs allow firm 
resources to be deployed more efficiently. For instance, the cost flexibility of linking pay to results, or 
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the temporal flexibility of job sharing may mean that the workforce is incentivised and able to respond 
better and faster to demand. The implications of these empirical findings are that workplaces 
implementing a certain mix of WFPs may outsmart their competitors. Interpreting the findings within 
the prism of the RBV also reinforces the heterogeneous nature of resources and capabilities for the firm, 
which, again, resonates in line with the results of this paper. WFPs are found to be diverse tools within 
the workplace, their association with corporate performance depending on workplace types. Thus, our 
results point to the importance of the diverse nature of WFPs and workplace heterogeneity.  
The results also shed light upon the very real world practicalities of how WFPs can enhance 
corporate performance in different workplaces. Therefore, this research possesses utility for both 
individual workplaces and the overall economy. Nevertheless, our analysis is limited by the type of the 
data available, in particular its cross-sectional nature and the fact that incomplete responses to the 
WERS 2004 financial questionnaire have unnecessarily curtailed the sample. Hence, we signal the need 
for improved data availability on WFPs and objective performance measures, while longitudinal 
research would enable further informative analysis.  
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical view of labour market flexibility / workplace flexibility practices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Whyman and Baimbridge (2006). 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for workplaces in the samplea 
Variables according to which 
the sample is split
b
 
Resulting sub-samples 
Percent in total 
sample 
Number of 
workplaces 
1. Workplace ownership 
Fully UK owned
c
 71 397 
Not fully UK owned 29 159 
    
2. Workplace age 
Up to 9 years 22 122 
10 to 24 years 28 156 
25 or more years 50 278 
    
3. Workplace wage level
d
 
Relatively high 61 341 
Relatively low 39 211 
    
4. Workplace unionisation 
Unionised 46 256 
Non-Unionised 54 300 
    
5. Workplace size  
    (employee headcount) 
Under 50 employees 40 224 
50 or more employees  60 332 
Source: Data derived from WERS 2004. 
Notes: 
a
The total sample used in this paper has 556 workplaces.
 
b
This column shows the five variables according to which the sample of 556 workplaces used in this paper is split into sub-
samples in order to tailor the results to workplace ownership, age, wage level, unionisation and size.
 
c
UK stands for United Kingdom.
 
d
A workplace is categorized as ‘relatively high’ wage if all employees earn more than £5.01 per hour, and as ‘relatively low’ 
wage if the proportion of employees in the workplace earning under £5.01 per hour is greater than zero. On average, private 
sector workplaces had 9.6 percent of their workforce earning wages under £5.01 per hour. 
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Table 2. Workplace flexibility areas, subareas, and practices analysed in this paper 
Source: Data derived from WERS 2004. 
Notes: N = 556 workplaces. Part-time worker’s proportion is a continuous variable. Questions are asked in relation to 
employees defined in WERS 2004 as "experienced [largest occupational group]" (DTI, 2005). 
Area Subarea 
Workplace flexibility 
practices (WFPs) 
Question (Q) asked of the workplace manager and 
answer options (A) in the WERS 2004 questionnaire 
Cases when 
WFPs take value 
1 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
N
u
m
er
ic
a
l 
fl
ex
ib
il
it
y
 
E
m
p
lo
y
-
m
en
t 
re
g
u
la
ti
o
n
 
1. Working from home 
Q. Do you have any of the following working time 
arrangements for any employees at this workplace?  
A. Working at or from home in normal working hours. 
if yes 0.40 0.49 
S
u
p
p
ly
 o
f 
la
b
o
u
r 
2. Internal labour market 
used for filling vacancies 
Q. Which of these statements best describes your 
approach to filling vacancies at this workplace?  
A. a) Internal applicants are only source, no external 
recruitment; b) Internal applicants are given preference, 
other things being equal. 
if yes to 
a) or b) 
0.34 0.47 
T
em
p
o
ra
l 
fl
ex
ib
il
it
y
 3. Shift working 
Q. Do you have any of the following working time 
arrangements for any employees at this workplace? 
…A. Shift working. 
if yes 0.51 0.50 
4. Flexitime 
…A. Flexi-time (where an employee has no set start or 
finish time but an agreement to work a set number of 
hours per week or per month). 
if yes 0.40 0.49 
5. Job sharing 
…A. Job sharing schemes (sharing a full-time job with 
another employee). 
if yes 0.34 0.48 
6. Part-time workers’ 
proportion in total workers 
Q. How many employees at this establishment work 
part-time (fewer than 30 hours per week)? 
- 0.23 0.27 
F
u
n
ct
io
n
a
l 
fl
ex
ib
il
it
y
 
L
ab
o
u
r 
q
u
al
it
y
 
7. Training extent:  
time off for over 60% of 
employees 
Q. What proportion of employees have been given time 
off from their normal daily work duties to undertake 
training over the past 12 months? 
if A ≥ 60 0.51 0.50 
8. Training length:  
two or more days off 
Q. On average, how many days of training did 
employees undertake over the past 12 months? 
if A ≥ 2 0.65 0.48 
9. Job enrichment  
in an ad-hoc manner 
Q. We frequently ask employees at our workplace to 
help us in ways not specified in their job description. 
if A is "agree" or 
"strongly agree" 
0.57 0.50 
10. Job enrichment  
via formal training 
Q. What proportion of employees are formally trained to 
be able to do jobs other than their own? 
if A ≥ 40 0.28 0.45 
11. Investors in People 
award 
Q. Is your organisation accredited as an Investor in 
People? 
if yes 0.44 0.50 
H
ig
h
-p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 o
rg
an
is
at
io
n
 
12. Quality circles 
Q. Do you have groups of non-managerial employees at 
this workplace that solve specific problems or discuss 
aspects of performance or quality?  
if yes 0.34 0.47 
13. Outsourcing of 
temporary vacancies filling 
Q. Are any activities or services on this card carried out 
for this workplace by independent contractors? 
…A. Temporary filling of vacant posts at this workplace 
if yes 0.29 0.45 
14. Outsourcing extent: 
fewer than five out of ten 
most commonly 
outsourced activities 
…A. Cleaning of building and premises; Security; 
Catering; Building maintenance; Printing/photocopying; 
Payroll; Transport of documents/goods; Computing 
services; Training; Recruitment. 
if fewer than  
5 yes answers 
0.52 0.50 
15. Job autonomy extent: 
a lot of job discretion or 
involvement in jobs 
Q. To what extent would you say that individual 
employees here have … A. a) discretion over how they 
do their work?; b) involvement in decisions over how 
their work is organized?  
if A is "a lot" to 
a) or b) 
0.31 0.46 
16. Teamwork extent:  
over 40% of employees 
work in teams 
Q. What proportion, if any, of employees at this 
workplace work in formally designated teams? 
if A ≥ 40 0.75 0.43 
C
o
st
 
fl
ex
ib
il
it
y
 
In
d
u
st
ri
al
 
re
la
ti
o
n
s 
17. Pay set through 
negotiations with trade 
unions 
Q. What proportion of all employees here have their pay 
set through negotiations with trade unions, either at this 
workplace or at a higher level? 
if A > 0 0.35 0.48 
In
ce
n
ti
v
e 
p
ay
 
18. Profit-related  
payments 
Q. Do any employees at this workplace receive profit-
related payments or profit-related bonuses?  
if yes 0.44 0.50 
19. Merit pay or payment 
by results 
Q. Do any of the employees in this establishment get 
paid by results or receive merit pay?  
A. a) Payment by results; b) Merit Pay; c) Neither. 
if yes to 
a) or b) 
0.51 0.50 
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Table 3. Relationships between workplace flexibility practices and financial turnover 
 
All 
workplaces 
 1. Workplace  
ownership 
 2. Workplace  
age 
 3. Workplace  
wage level 
 4. Workplace  
unionisation 
 5. Workplace  
size 
Workplace flexibility practices 
 Fully British 
owned  
Not fully 
British 
owned 
 Up to 9 years 10 to 24 
years 
25 or more 
years 
 Relatively  
high wage  
Relatively  
low wage  
 Unionised Non-
unionised 
 Under 50 
employees 
50 or more 
employees 
1  2 3  4 5 6  7 8  9 10  11 12 
Workplace size: employee 
headcount 
0.002***  0.002*** 0.001***  0.003** 0.003*** 0.002***  0.002*** 0.002***  0.002*** 0.002***  - - 
(7.638)  (6.239) (4.575)  (4.417) (4.925) (5.899)  (5.650) (3.955)  (8.422) (3.889)  
  
                
Workplace size (squared) 
-1.25e-07***  -3.28e-07*** -8.91e-08***  -2.35e-07*** -5.97e-07*** -3.61e-07***  -1.34e-07*** -2.08e-07**  -1.42e-07*** -4.50e-07***  - - 
(-4.345)  (-3.512) (-3.064)  (-3.630) (-3.814) (-3.527)  (-4.130) (-2.351)  (-5.689) (-2.871)  
NUMERICAL FLEXIBILITY 
Employment regulation 
Working from home 
0.144  0.112 0.207  0.034 -0.040 0.156  0.220 -0.131  -0.222 0.653***  0.333 0.042 
(0.920)  (0.573) (0.825)  (0.088) (-0.135) (0.731)  (1.043) (-0.470)  (-1.055) (2.702)  (1.096) (0.228) 
Supply of labour 
Internal labour market used 
for filling vacancies 
0.282  0.059 0.162  0.343 0.582* 0.016  0.200 0.337  0.071 0.424*  0.352 0.128 
(1.617)  (0.257) (0.652)  (1.161) (1.852) (0.064)  (0.877) (1.200)  (0.324) (1.654)  (0.985) (0.666) 
Temporal flexibility 
Shift working 
0.220  0.226 0.091  -0.163 0.655** 0.165  0.102 0.246  0.023 0.318  0.366 -0.026 
(1.313)  (1.161) (0.300)  (-0.515) (2.042) (0.606)  (0.441) (0.940)  (0.076) (1.528)  (1.204) (-0.124) 
                  
Flexitime 
-0.114  -0.110 0.052  -0.609* 0.383 0.119  -0.103 -0.010  -0.144 0.036  0.265 -0.162 
(-0.703)  (-0.527) (0.211)  (-1.666) (1.128) (0.530)  (-0.480) (-0.349)  (-0.639) (0.160)  (0.798) (-0.920) 
                  
Job sharing 
-0.009  -0.131 0.296  0.261 -0.849** 0.059  -0.013 0.018  -0.072 0.211  -0.301 0.105 
(-0.050)  (-0.572) (0.983)  (0.534) (-2.364) (0.237)  (-0.055) (0.061)  (-0.316) (0.803)  (-0.830) (0.511) 
                  
Part-time workers’ 
proportion in total workers 
-0.589*  -0.543 -1.030  -1.172* 0.108 -0.941*  -0.670 -0.588  -0.246 -0.938**  -1.109** -0.306 
(-1.765)  (-1.474) (-1.382)  (-1.886) (0.193) (-1.725)  (-1.515) (-1.172)  (-0.480) (-2.181)  (-2.224) (-0.626) 
FUNCTIONAL FLEXIBILITY 
Labour quality 
Training extent:  
time off for over 60% 
employees have  
-0.023  0.084 -0.251  -0.750** -0.847*** 0.467*  -0.038 0.010  -0.268 0.006  0.132 -0.021 
(-0.153)  (0.443) (-0.986)  (-2.108) (-3.043) (1.851)  (-0.186) (0.035)  (-1.228) (0.030)  (0.509) (-0.113) 
                  
Training length:  
two or more days off  
-0.521***  -0.568*** -0.367  0.079 -0.827*** -0.623***  -0.609** -0.433*  -0.280 -0.742***  -0.776*** -0.223 
(-3.034)  (-2.591) (-1.385)  (0.200) (-2.933) (-2.623)  (-2.518) (-1.758)  (-1.227) (-3.310)  (-2.851) (-1.094) 
                  
Job enrichment  
in an ad-hoc manner 
-0.161  -0.195 -0.222  0.169 -0.282 -0.361  -0.148 -0.043  -0.076 -0.277  0.012 -0.263 
(-1.092)  (-1.07) (-0.854)  (0.564) (-1.172) (-1.622)  (-0.768) (-0.168)  (-0.338) (-1.366)  (0.049) (-1.409) 
                  
Job enrichment  
via formal training 
0.029  0.213 -0.227  0.620 -0.253 0.113  0.081 -0.240  0.379* -0.279  -0.133 0.075 
(0.187)  (1.099) (-0.834)  (1.614) (-0.794) (0.527)  (0.406) (-0.874)  (1.815) (-1.224)  (-0.456) (0.436) 
                  
Investors in People award 0.199  0.179 0.291  0.182 0.280 0.222  0.180 0.281  0.167 0.237  0.075 0.227 
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(1.341)  (0.956) (1.258)  (0.569) (1.022) (1.056)  (0.908) (1.097)  (0.834) (1.093)  (0.295) (1.324) 
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Table 3. (Cont.) 
 
 
All 
workplaces 
1. Workplace 
ownership 
 2. Workplace  
age 
 3. Workplace  
wage level 
 4. Workplace 
unionisation 
 5. Workplace  
size 
Workplace flexibility practices 
Fully 
British 
owned  
Not fully 
British  
owned 
 Up to 9 
years 
10 to 24 
years 
25 or more 
years 
 Relatively 
 high wage  
Relatively  
low wage  
 Unionised Non-
unionised 
 Under 50 
employees 
50 or more 
employees 
1 2 3  4 5 6  7 8  9 10  11 12 
FUNCTIONAL FLEXIBILITY (cont.) 
High-performance organisation 
Quality circles 
-0.048 0.175 -0.438*  -0.008 -0.168 0.045  0.202 -0.598**  -0.016 -0.096  -0.019 0.032 
(-0.299) (0.930) (-1.707)  (-0.017) (-0.543) (0.210)  (0.959) (-2.251)  (-0.071) (-0.426)  (-0.062) (0.161) 
                 
Outsourcing of temporary vacancies filling 
-0.144 -0.265 0.295  -0.097 0.807* -0.646***  -0.287 0.068  -0.226 -0.099  -0.096 -0.239 
(-0.801) (-1.230) (0.900)  (-0.298) (1.691) (-3.206)  (-1.459) (0.169)  (-1.020) (-0.358)  (-0.216) (-1.291) 
                 
Outsourcing extent: fewer than five out of ten 
most commonly outsourced activities 
-0.271* -0.142 -0.481*  -0.313 0.018 -0.084  -0.146 -0.377  -0.366* -0.085  0.257 -0.658*** 
(-1.752) (-0.828) (-1.716)  (-0.926) (0.058) (-0.385)  (-0.720) (-1.442)  (-1.662) (-0.379)  (1.037) (-3.510) 
                 
Job autonomy extent: 
a lot of job discretion or involvement in jobs 
-0.424** -0.610*** 0.053  -0.515* -0.533** -0.170  -0.390* -0.448  -0.347 -0.639***  -0.765** -0.082 
(-2.518) (-3.024) (0.186)  (-1.776) (-2.235) (-0.638)  (-1.772) (-1.592)  (-1.469) (-2.939)  (-2.557) (-0.417) 
                 
Teamwork extent:  
over 40% of employees in teams 
0.115 0.032 0.870**  -0.506 0.267 0.314  0.025 0.260  0.273 0.082  0.073 -0.023 
(0.563) (0.127) (2.457)  (-1.603) (0.789) (0.945)  (0.092) (0.872)  (0.938) (0.301)  (0.238) (-0.082) 
                 
COST FLEXIBILITY 
Industrial relations 
Pay set through negotiations with trade unions 
-0.341 -0.290 -1.235***  -0.012 -0.873** -0.382  -0.631** 0.149  -0.570** -  -0.015 -0.387 
(-1.319) (-0.984) (-2.669)  (-0.0287) (-2.250) (-0.895)  (-2.081) (0.289)  (-2.190)  (-0.032) (-1.527) 
Incentive pay 
Profit-related payments 
0.311** 0.420** -0.270  0.501 0.173 0.229  0.379** 0.068  0.567*** -0.005  0.203 0.276* 
(2.231) (2.426) (-1.058)  (1.546) (0.595) (1.195)  (2.106) (0.261)  (2.681) (-0.024)  (0.759) (1.744) 
 
                
Merit pay or 
payment by results 
0.364** 0.349* 0.362  -0.160 1.088*** 0.287  0.383* 0.375  0.436** 0.208  0.358 0.449** 
(2.287) (1.822) (1.437)  (-0.449) (3.544) (1.232)  (1.745) (1.463)  (2.073) (0.905)  (1.279) (2.486) 
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Table 3. (Cont.) 
 
 
 
All 
workplaces 
1. Workplace 
ownership 
 2. Workplace  
age 
 3. Workplace  
wage level 
 4. Workplace 
unionisation 
 5. Workplace  
size 
Workplace flexibility practices 
Fully 
British 
owned  
Not fully 
British  
owned 
 Up to 9 
years 
10 to 24 
years 
25 or more 
years 
 Relatively 
 high wage  
Relatively  
low wage  
 Unionised Non-
unionised 
 Under 50 
employees 
50 or more 
employees 
 
Control variables 
 
Fully British owned -0.715*** - -  -0.572 -0.889** -0.807***  -1.041*** -0.271  -1.266*** -0.410*  -0.926** -0.696*** 
(-4.281)    (-1.299) (-2.587) (-3.629)  (-4.710) (-0.954)  (-5.207) (-1.766)  (-2.548) (-3.369) 
                 
Workplace age: up to 9 years -0.340 -0.368 -0.644*  - - -  -0.232 -0.640*  0.223 -0.768***  -0.802** -0.024 
(-1.642) (-1.463) (-1.880)      (-0.835) (-1.949)  (0.737) (-2.974)  (-2.481) (-0.088) 
                 
Workplace age: 10 to 24 years -0.344* -0.452** -0.019  - - -  -0.485* -0.282  0.029 -0.613**  -0.864** 0.089 
(-1.919) (-2.133) (-0.056)      (-1.946) (-1.044)  (0.112) (-2.453)  (-2.479) (0.444) 
                 
Proportion of emp. in wage bands A or B (low 
wage) 
-0.004 -0.003 -0.004  -0.011 -0.004 -0.007  - -  -0.009 -0.0004  0.001 -0.008* 
(-0.712) (-0.462) (-0.324)  (-1.519) (-0.486) (-1.000)     (-1.005) (-0.075)  (0.132) (-1.664) 
                 
Workplace is unionised 0.098 -0.337 1.926***  0.191 0.311 0.027  0.164 0.010  - -  -0.683* 0.427* 
(0.428) (-1.435) (3.725)  (0.522) (0.832) (0.071)  (0.593) (0.023)    (-1.690) (1.694) 
                 
Workplace size: under 50 employees -1.342*** -1.376*** -0.621*  -1.316*** -1.218*** -0.835***  -1.374*** -1.421***  -1.605*** -0.751***  - - 
(-7.375) (-6.454) (-1.722)  (-4.015) (-3.516) (-2.886)  (-5.769) (-4.403)  (-4.560) (-3.094)    
                 
                 
Constant 9.839*** 9.257*** 8.828***  9.827*** 9.079*** 9.553***  10.19*** 9.422***  10.21*** 9.474***  8.307*** 9.746*** 
 (30.48) (25.42) (13.85)  (14.79) (15.30) (22.62)  (24.85) (18.47)  (22.60) (19.10)  (12.10) (26.68) 
Observations 484 346 138  110 140 234  301 183  219 265  211 273 
R-Squared 0.528 0.471 0.655  0.646 0.671 0.517  0.550 0.543  0.644 0.442  0.281 0.462 
Value of F test 26.12*** 16.92*** 11.72***  17.52*** 17.82*** 16.23***  19.63*** 16.80***  21.05*** 13.49***  5.20*** 13.24*** 
P-Value for F test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
VIF 1.65 1.85 2.16  3.74 2.69 2.20  1.75 2.09  1.75 1.98  2.80 1.71 
White test 392.07 346.00 138.00  110.00 140.00 234.00  301.00 183.00  219.00 265.00  211.00 273.00 
P-Value for White test 0.324 0.475 0.460  0.482 0.460 0.469  0.473 0.465  0.468 0.471  0.468 0.472 
Source: Data derived from WERS 2004. ***Statistically significant at 0.010 level; **at 0.050 level; *at 0.100 level. 
Notes: t-Stats in parentheses. Linear regressions are run with robust standard error option. Workplace size was not entered in models where data was split according to this variable; similarly, while pay set 
via unions is not entered in the regression related to non-unionised workplaces. Results are consistent and robust. Further details are available from the authors upon request. 
